THE DEMOGRAPHICS AND ECONOMICS OF UK HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE FOR OLDER ADULTS

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1. Introduction

Policy makers in much of Europe have expressed deep concerns with regard to the increasing pressure on health and social care costs arising from the demographic ageing of their populations (Richter 1992). Although a number of (cross-national) studies have considered the determinants of (especially) health care costs, only one has found that the *age structure* of the population (proportion of population aged 65 and over being taken as the age structure indicator) is an explanatory factor alongside the effects of *income, lifestyle characteristics, and environmental factors* (Kleiman 1974; Getzen 1992; Gerdtham et al 1998; Hitris and Posnett, 1992; Leu 1986; OECD 1987; O’Connell 1996; Gerdtham et al 1992, 1992a). This brief paper attempts to address relevant issues relating to population ageing and health and social care expenditure, including economic evaluations, drawing primarily on UK and North American literature from both medical and economics journals. Particularly the paper by Seshamani and Gray (2002) is worthy of extra note.

It should be pointed out that this is not intended to be an extensive exhaustive review of the literature on the effects of population ageing on health and social care expenditure nor on economic evaluations of health care. Indeed, as we point out later the number of journal articles on economic evaluations has increased dramatically through the 1980s and 1990s, totalling more than 5500 in peer-reviewed journals in those two decades, with approximately 4000 of these in the 1990s alone. However, there seems to be a consensus of opinion in the literature addressed in this brief paper – supporting a non-extensive review – that economic evaluations lack methodological robustness and integrity in relation to resource allocation. Especially cross-national comparisons appear to be problematic.

The bibliography includes articles and work referenced in the body of this brief review paper but also additional UK and North American work which may prove useful in further work, should that be deemed desirable.

Before via the literature we consider the impact of ageing on health (and social) care expenditures (in the UK) and the economics of health care (evaluations/interventions), we present briefly UK (and European) population data as a demographic backdrop to that work along with a brief
review of UK policy initiatives for the health and social care of older people particularly aimed at preventing dependence.

2. The demographic backdrop

2.1 Mortality: Across Europe, the shadow of mortality has been lifting throughout the 20th century, the result being that new generations of Europeans can expect to live longer than any other previous generations – and significantly longer than their parents and grandparents and great grandparents, all of whom are likely to be alive when these new generations are born.

In the post war years, European countries fell quite nicely and orderly and naturally into a two tier classification as far as life expectancies were concerned with the more developed northern countries leading the way ahead of the less developed southern and eastern countries (Meslé 1996). European life expectancies did converge, however, in the course of the next 20-25 years especially as high mortality countries in the south and east experienced quite dramatic declines while the low mortality countries of the north were finding it difficult to push levels even lower.

At the end of the 20th century, the situation had changed again (Leeson 2002). While the countries of the European Union had continued their overall mortality declines and increasing life expectancies at birth, the Baltic States and the Eastern European countries are falling noticeably behind again.

The post war period is thus an interesting period in terms of European mortality development with the above-mentioned east-west differences. In the United Kingdom, mortality levels declined throughout the period at almost all ages, and with the exception of decreases in infant mortality, the mortality decline at around age 40 was the most significant in the 1970-1990 period. Table 1 presents the development in life expectancies at certain ages over more recent years. Life expectancies at birth in the United Kingdom increase throughout the period and for both sexes as mortality declines at almost all ages. In fact, in the United Kingdom, it is particularly the scale of the decline in adult and old age mortality, which contributes to the observed increases in life expectancies at birth as infant mortality although declining is already so low in this country that the contribution of this decline to the
increase in life expectancy at birth is more modest. And towards the end of the 20th century, almost all of the increase in life expectancy at birth in the United Kingdom is thanks to decreases in mortality at relatively high ages.

Table 1. Life expectancies at certain ages in the United Kingdom, males and females, 1980-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age 0</th>
<th>Age 50</th>
<th>Age 60</th>
<th>Age 80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe 2000, Council of Europe and Office of National Statistics

Mortality (and as mentioned in the introduction health care expenditure) seems increasingly to be related to life styles and behaviour, such as smoking, alcohol consumption and the consumption of animal fats. For instance, at the European level, alcohol-related cancer mortality is six times greater in the northwest of France than in southern Italy, and lung cancer mortality is much higher in the United Kingdom and Germany as well as the Benelux countries, where smoking has long been widespread and started at least a generation ago among younger people. Mortality from cardiovascular diseases is generally higher in Northern Europe where the use of animal fats is extensive compared with the Southern European countries where such mortality is lower.

Late-age mortality is an increasingly important component of overall mortality (Grundy 1997) and it is changes in these mortality levels that could still confound population forecasts, as they have done in the recent past (Leeson 1981).

2.2 Fertility: Fertility is the most evasive demographic component to describe and to predict. In general, the countries of Europe have come through the demographic transition (Livi-Bacci 1992) and entered what some demographers call the second demographic transition (van de Kaa 1987). It is important to underline that there has never been a European pattern of fertility and probably never will
be. Even during the demographic transition there were major differences both with regard to fertility levels and with regard to the date of the onset of the continual fertility decline. In the mid 1980s, many industrialised countries – not just in Europe – were experiencing historically low levels of fertility, and there was a widespread fear among demographers and decision-makers that this birth shortage inevitably would lead to population decline. A great deal of research was done at the time to document the consequences of declining and ageing populations which had climbed up the political agenda (Davis et al. 1986).

Although calendar measures of fertility indicated a plateau at reproduction level in the 1930s and 1940s at what was seen as the end of the classical demographic transition and a subsequent further decline to levels significantly below replacement levels, generational measures of fertility indicated that in fact it seemed more feasible that fertility levels had simply been undergoing a continuous smooth decline since the decline of the transition had begun. In some countries, this downward trend had certainly been interrupted by periodic increases (during and immediately after the 2nd World War and in the mid 1960s), but these were by no means indicators of new lasting trends. Day (1995) implied that there is little or no agreement on the cause(s) of these trends. It may be that fundamental norms and values with regard to the need and desire to have children have changed radically, or it may be that the underlying economic structure in modern societies has changed and taken these childbearing norms with it. The evidence points in all directions. Wealthy nations – with welfare levels more than sufficient to induce childbearing – face massive population decline, while a country like Pakistan in the midst of an economic recession seems to be on the verge of a fertility transition despite the economic climate (Sathar and Casterline 1998).

Despite some increase in fertility levels in some countries towards the end of the 20th century, fertility remains well and truly below replacement levels of 2.1 in Europe and seems to be a characteristic of post-industrial societies. Fertility decline has not developed alone. It has been accompanied by quite dramatic shifts in associated behaviour (marriage patterns, divorce patterns, family structures, ages at birth, contraception methods etc), which in turn may or may not be affected by the social and economic climate in a country. Whatever the causes of the decline, fertility behaviour
and the associated norms and values as far as marriage and childbearing are concerned have undergone change.

Modern methods of contraception have made it simple to determine the exact number of children and the exact timing of births. In England & Wales, almost 10 per cent of the 1946-generation of women were childless by age 40. This had risen to almost 20 per cent for the 1960-generation. The total fertility rate for the UK and its development since 1960 is illustrated in table 2, and it is clear that fertility levels have been insufficient to reproduce and replace the population since the mid 1970s – and there is little substantial evidence of an upswing in levels.

**Table 2. Total fertility rate (TFR) in the United Kingdom, 1960-2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom TFR</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The total fertility rate is the average number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if she were to pass through and survive her childbearing years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates of a given year*

*Source: Recent Demographic Developments in Europe 2001, Council of Europe*

**2.3 Age structure:** The UK national population age structure, in line with most Western countries, has aged continuously over the past century, the measure of ageing being an increase in the percentage of those over 60 years, and a decrease in those under 15 years. The 2001 Census noted the official maturing of the UK population, as the number of individuals aged over 60 was greater than those aged under 15. The proportion of the UK population aged over 60 had reached 21 per cent by 2001. Of these, 36 per cent were aged over 75, corresponding to 7.5 per cent of the total population, and 9 per cent were aged over 85, comprising 2 per cent of the total UK population. However, the numbers of older people in the UK are predicted to increase significantly over the next 25 years (table 3). Growth will be particularly significant among the oldest old – by 2025 more than one quarter of the UK’s population will be aged over 60 years, with more than a third of these aged over 75 years. These demographics have arisen through the above-mentioned combination of decreasing mortality, leading to increased longevity, and declining fertility, both resulting in a higher percentage of older
adults within the population. As outlined above, life expectancy at birth has risen from 70.8 years for males and 76.9 years for females in 1980 to 75.3 and 80.1 years respectively in 2000. Alongside this, fertility declined more or less continually over the last 40 years of the 20th century, falling from 2.71 in 1964 to 1.65 in 2000.

Table 3. Census and projected population of the UK, 2001 and 2025. Thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>2001 Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>2025 Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>11,105</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>10,512</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29</td>
<td>11,077</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>11,117</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>13,271</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>12,910</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td>11,115</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>12,672</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-74</td>
<td>7,816</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>11,234</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75+</td>
<td>4,405</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6,392</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58,789</td>
<td></td>
<td>64,836</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 2001 and National population projections 2000-based

3. UK policy initiatives for the care of older people

The changing demographics of the UK population, which we have outlined above, has been reflected in considerable developments over the past two decades in health and social care policy for older people. As Harper and Leeson’s (2002; 2003) recent review and evaluation of current government policy promoting independent living for older people argues, a shift has occurred with regard to both the health and social care policy agendas. With the rejection of institutional solutions comes the focus on independence and the provision of necessary care close to home. Some of the central concerns of policy development are to increase individual citizen input into this development, increase choice, increase diversity and increase inclusion, with self-reliance remaining one of government’s key objectives. The concepts of active ageing, social inclusion and independence are complex concepts relying on a wide range of diverse but interrelated factors, and this has been reflected in recent policy developments in this area. Current Government policies for older and disabled people thus aim to promote health and independence, provide person-centred services to meet individual needs, help people remain in the community, support carers, modernize and integrate service, and deliver value for money. Such policies are very heavily reliant on the availability of unpaid informal, typically family
care from within the community (Harper and Leeson, 2002), and indeed current models for service distribution specifically factor in available family care (Harper and Leeson, 2003).

The White Paper on Community Care in 1989 emphasized the need for older people to stay at home for as long as possible (Department of Health, 1989). The resultant NHS and Community Care Act of 1990 aimed to encourage the development of community care provision, enabling older people to remain at home. In 2001, the National Service Framework for Older People (NSF) became the main policy instrument through which the government works to modernizing health and social care services for older people (Department of Health, 2001). The goals of the NSF for older people include promoting independence and person-centred care; improving the quality and consistency of services; expanding service capacity and the reform of long-term care. In July 2000, the Government announced in the NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000) the development of services for older people. Intermediate care services between hospital and home were to be introduced to prevent loss of independence. By placing the focus on policies that enable older people to stay in their own homes while receiving care, the NHS Plan places independence as central, importantly supported by joined up thinking: “housing, primary care, community health services and social services, together need to provide effective support”. A major stated objective is to ensure that older people can “secure and sustain their independence in a home appropriate to their circumstance”. The government here emphasizes the inclusion and evaluation of the needs of vulnerable groups and the provision of guidance on good practice in healthcare delivery and support for minority ethnic groups.

The Better Care, Higher Standards is a joint measure from the Department of Health (DoH) and the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), acting to inform those in receipt of care of the standards they can expect. Recognising the particular difficulties of older people, local authority strategies have shifted focus from simply protecting people to also protecting/adapting their properties, the idea being that more and better advice on home maintenance will help older people to plan their housing future as they grow older and face the possibility of frailty. Extra government funding for Home Improvement Agencies (HIA) has enabled many older people to stay in their own homes for longer periods. The Supporting People Programme will provide housing-related
support for vulnerable people from April 2003, such as information services and access to wider web services (DETR, 2001). *The Better Government for Older People Programme* and the *Interministerial Group* for older people also recommend measures which would decrease dependency, by providing more independent living opportunities, better quality provision of sheltered housing, and clear information and advice on what is available.

The cross-departmental initiative *Modernising Government* underlines the importance of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) strategy for alleviating poverty and promoting independence in retirement by means of increasing the take-up of existing services, including financial services as well as health and social care. One of the Department's key components for improving the delivery of benefits and information to pensioners is the *Pension Service*, which is delivered through 26 pension centres and is supported by a local service working with a range of partner organisations. At the same time, DWP together with a number of other government departments is developing *Third Age Services (TAS)*, a holistic and joined-up model of service delivery for older people providing an integrated gateway to access benefits, health, housing and social care, in the first instance via inter-agency working. The development of TAS is part of a widespread growth in initiatives designed to facilitate the independence of older people by improving access to services. Others include *Care Direct*, a service led by the Department of Health but linked to NHS Direct and run locally by local authorities in partnership with other government and non-government organisations. Finally, *Sheltered housing* is the primary housing-based way of helping older people to maintain independence. It is available in the public or private sectors to rent, purchase or through shared ownership. Approximately ½ million older people live in rented sheltered housing accommodation in England with an additional 100,000 living in private sheltered housing otherwise known as retirement housing or leasehold schemes. The majority of sheltered housing residents have low incomes and are therefore dependent on income support or housing benefit to pay their rent, other essential housing costs and for housing support services, which are valued by residents as enabling them to live active and independent lives in the community.
4. Ageing and health care expenditure

Typically, as pointed out by Seshamani and Gray (2002), attempts to investigate the effects of demographics on health care expenditure have simply linked (chronological) age and the use and/or cost of health care services. These patterns are then applied to the demographics of a population (changing over time) to assess the effect of (changing) demographics on the use and cost of health care services. The results imply that age contributes to between 0.3 and 0.8 per cent of annual expenditure growth (OECD 1988; Gerdtham 1993; Barer et al 1989). This simple and illustrative way of assessing the age-cost effects does, however, ignore the fact that age-specific utilisation patterns among different age groups change over time. Changing demographics is not the only dynamic factor in the equation. Such a time-series approach have become more common and reveal that health care expenditures have increased disproportionally among the very young and the very old (Gerdtham 1993; Mendelson and Schwartz 1993; Cutler and Meara 1998; Barer et al 1987; Cutler and Meara 1999).

OECD data reveal that in developed countries, per capita health care costs for those aged 65 years and over have increased at the same rate at least as for those aged less than 65 years. The UK however does not exhibit this pattern – there is a disproportionately smaller increase in per capita costs for the older ages compared with younger age groups (Seshamani and Gray 2002). These authors have analysed this result in more detail to determine whether or not the UK is an exception in the trends of health care expenditure for older people.

In contrast to the findings of previous studies, Seshamani and Gray (2002) found that in England and Wales the high cost older age groups (65 years and over) did not have larger increases in their health care costs than the middle age groups in the period 1985-87 to 1996-99. On the contrary, for combined National Health Service care costs and for Hospital and Community Health Service costs, the oldest old (aged 85 years and over) had decreases in their real per capita costs while other age groups had real cost increases. This actually meant that the proportion of national health care expenditure allocated to the older age groups had decreased over time. The authors point out that this levelling out of expenditure allocation is mainly a result of moving costs away from the older
population for non-acute hospital care. Family health service costs and acute in-patient care costs increased relatively more for the older age groups.

The different patterns of cost-change for different age groups among the health care sectors may reflect:

- differing health service needs of the different age groups;
- different patient management schemes in the different sectors;
- decreased access to care for older patients, as has been demonstrated (Bowling et al 2001);
- a shifting of older patients from non-acute hospital and community health services to other social care settings (residential and nursing homes).

As far as the latter possibility is concerned, it has been shown that the market value of the nursing and residential care sector for older people increased by 43 per cent from 1988 to 1998 while the value of long stay hospital care in the national health service decreased by 52 per cent (Laing and Buisson 1999).

What does seem to be clear is that some service substitution out of the national health service has occurred.

Comparisons with Japan, Canada and Australia seem to indicate that the experience of the UK is the exception rather than the rule (Seshamani and Gray 2001). A number of studies have underlined that the observed relationship between health care expenditure and age can be explained by the concentration of health care expenditure in the period immediately prior to death (Lubitz and Riley 1993; McGrail et al 2000; Himsworth et al 1999; Zweifel et al 1999; O’Neill et al 2000). In other words, the higher health costs associated with older age groups need not be linked to age but rather to the increasing proximity of death.

5. The economics of health care

In the late 1990s, industrialised countries devoted quite large proportions of GDP to health care, ranging from 7 per cent in the UK to 14 per cent in the United States. The various systems providing health care differ substantially, and thus far, no system provides the paradigm for others. There is a universal desire to limit government and private expenditures for health care while improving health
care outcomes, thereby ensuring that health care productivity is an important policy issue as we move into the 21st century. Baily and Garber (1997) argue that the UK governmental system of health care financing and provision is relatively well-positioned to implement integrated programmes for managing chronic diseases, while under-investment in new (and old) technologies may impair productivity. They suggest that flexibility in the organisation of care, together with competition among providers and appropriate incentives are most likely to promote productivity. But would this lead to higher prices and administrative costs offsetting any productivity improvements?

The evaluation of the economics of care and the development of cost-effectiveness measures have been and remain an important issue for both researchers, practitioners and policy makers, perhaps increasingly as the demographic ageing of the population combined with the seemingly endless opportunities for treatment and care appear to threaten the provision of health and social care. In many ways, however, this is a relatively new area, and the first paper for example to compare directly the efficiency of very different types of health care interventions and to challenge UK government policy was not published until 2001 (Fox-Rushby et al 2001). Similarly, although certain interventions have been in place for some time now (home visits to older people, for example), health economic evaluations are not always in place yet (Hendriksen and Vass 2003).

In the United States too, the fear of ageing baby-boomers and their health and social care needs has been a recurrent theme of debate and research (Lee and Skinner 1999; Shoven et al 1994). Long-term US forecasts predict that by the year 2030 almost 33 per cent of GDP will be accounted for by health care (Burner et al 1992; Warshawsky 1994). However, in the short term, any feared Medicare crisis in the US is claimed not to be because of increasing numbers of old people but because of increasing per capita health care expenditures – something which is dismissed for the UK (Seshamani and Gray 2002). Lee and Skinner (1999) discuss the future development of the US aged population, including forecasting disability and health status. The fact that measuring disability is fraught with confusion should not alter the fact that forecasters predict a long-term decline in the prevalence of disability (for example, Manton et al 1997; Freedman and Martin 1998) leading to significant savings in the Medicare budget. The increasing size and life expectancy of the aged population do give rise to
concern for health care services and the financing of these services, and they have also given rise to theoretical analyses of medical care utilization based either on the traditional consumer theory approach (Grossman 1972), which sees demand as primarily patient driven, or on the principal agent set-up (Zweifel 1981), which is based on the physician (as the agent) determining utilization on the part of the patient. Although the latter has been questioned (Deb and Trived 1997).

Even where an economic evaluation of healthcare interventions is in place, health economists often question the economic foundations of the approach, which is often based on calculating an incremental cost effectiveness ratio by comparing a new intervention against current practice, claiming this approach leads to contradictions (Donaldson et al 2002). The problem seems to be that incremental cost effectiveness ratios have more to do with resource allocation than cost effectiveness and economic evaluations should therefore pay attention to the type of efficiency addressed and opportunity costs (where would resources come from and what would have to be given up?), refraining from making recommendations if resource allocation issues are involved.

In fact, criticism of economic evaluations seems to be the rule rather than the exception with various commentators calling for higher methodological quality (Jefferson and Demicheli 2002). This is interesting in view of the fact that economic evaluation over the last two decades of the 20th century established itself as one of the tools for health care decision-making (Drummond et al 1996). In the 1980s, approximately 1800 peer-reviewed journal articles on economic evaluations were published in medical journals alone, rising to almost 2300 in the first half of the 1990s (Elixhauser 1993; Elixhauser et al 1998). Since these evaluations are used to allocate scarce health care resources, it is only fair to appraise the soundness of the methodology being applied. Again the early 1990s saw doubts cast on the scientific reliability of evaluations (Udvarhelyi et al 1992; Gerard 1992; Adams et al 1992; Jefferson and Demicheli 1994). Some attributed this deficiency in the published work to a lack of peer reviewers with health economics expertise (Jefferson and Demicheli 1995). The effects of various efforts to improve the quality seem limited (Jefferson and Demicheli 2002), and there remain problems with study design, data collection, analysis and interpretation (Petrou et al 2000).
Perhaps the multitude of evaluation methods and the critique of them led the Department of Health in the early 1990s to commission a systematic review of all published economic evaluations (Department of Health 1994) with a view to constructing an economic evaluation database. The question remains, however, how to extrapolate economic results between localities and countries, and caution seems to be the optimal advice available (Gosden and Torgerson 2002). Different conversion/extrapolation methods lead to very different cost utility ratios and there is no consensus as yet among health economists with regard to determining the right answer, something which makes decision making rather hazardous.

Clearly then, health care is a difficult area to research in terms of price and output measurement. That does not, however, deter researchers from attempting to develop economic measurement frameworks with a view to improving the quality of health care. Shapiro et al (1999) point out that treatment decisions should not be based on the flow utility of the treatment in any given period but on the benefits that can be expected to accrue over a lifetime. Health spending and health outcome may seem related, but American research indicates that health outcomes are independent of health spending and reimbursement systems so that spending appears to have low marginal value (Cutler 1995).

6. Concluding remarks

Policy makers in much of Europe have expressed deep concerns with regard to the increasing pressure on health and social care costs arising from the demographic ageing of their populations. Although a number of (cross-national) studies have considered the determinants of (especially) health care costs, only one has found that the age structure of the population (proportion of population aged 65 and over being taken as the age structure indicator) is an explanatory factor alongside the effects of income, lifestyle characteristics, and environmental factors.

Typically, attempts to investigate the effects of demographics on health care expenditure have simply linked (chronological) age and the use and/or cost of health care services. These patterns are then applied to the demographics of a population (changing over time) to assess the affect of
(changing) demographics on the use and cost of health care services. The results imply that age contributes to between 0.3 and 0.8 per cent of annual expenditure growth. This simple and illustrative way of assessing the age-cost effects does, however, ignore the fact that age-specific utilisation patterns among different age groups change over time. Changing demographics is not the only dynamic factor in the equation. Such a time-series approach has become more common and reveals that health care expenditures have increased disproportionately among the very young and the very old.

OECD data reveal that in developed countries, per capita health care costs for those aged 65 years and over have increased at the same rate at least as for those aged less than 65 years. The UK however does not exhibit this pattern – there is a disproportionately smaller increase in per capita costs for the older ages compared with younger age groups. In contrast to the findings of previous studies, it is found that in England and Wales the high cost older age groups (65 years and over) did not have larger increases in their health care costs than the middle age groups in the period 1985-87 to 1996-99. On the contrary, for combined National Health Service care costs and for Hospital and Community Health Service costs, the oldest old (aged 85 years and over) had decreases in their real per capita costs while other age groups had real cost increases. This actually meant that the proportion of national health care expenditure allocated to the older age groups had decreased over time. The authors point out that this levelling out of expenditure allocation is mainly a result of moving costs away from the older population for non-acute hospital care. Family health service costs and acute inpatient care costs increased relatively more for the older age groups.

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- a shifting of older patients from non-acute hospital and community health services to other social care settings (residential and nursing homes).
As far as the latter possibility is concerned, it has been shown that the market value of the nursing and residential care sector for older people increased by 43 per cent from 1988 to 1998 while the value of long stay hospital care in the national health service decreased by 52 per cent.

What does seem to be clear is that some service substitution out of the national health service has occurred.

Comparisons with Japan, Canada and Australia seem to indicate that the experience of the UK is the exception rather than the rule. A number of studies have underlined that the observed relationship between health care expenditure and age can be explained by the concentration of health care expenditure in the period immediately prior to death. In other words, the higher health costs associated with older age groups need not be linked to age but rather to the increasing proximity of death.

Even where an economic evaluation of healthcare interventions is in place, health economists often question the economic foundations of the approach, which is often based on calculating an incremental cost effectiveness ratio by comparing a new intervention against current practice, claiming this approach leads to contradictions. The problem seems to be that incremental cost effectiveness ratios have more to do with resource allocation than cost effectiveness and economic evaluations should therefore pay attention to the type of efficiency addressed and opportunity costs (where would resources come from and what would have to be given up?), refraining from making recommendations if resource allocation issues are involved.

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The question remains how to extrapolate economic results between localities and countries, and caution seems to be the optimal advice available. Different conversion/extrapolation methods lead to very different cost utility ratios and there is no consensus as yet among health economists with regard to determining the right answer, which makes decision making rather hazardous.

Treatment decisions should not be based on the flow utility of the treatment in any given period but on the **benefits that can be expected to accrue over a lifetime**. Health spending and health outcome may seem related, but American research indicates that **health outcomes are independent of health spending and reimbursement systems** so that spending appears to have low marginal value.

As far as the economics of early interventions are concerned, it has proven difficult to unearth literature addressing this area. This may be due to the fact that it is apparently exceedingly difficult to carry out robust economic evaluations of health care procedures, and when the **cause and effect** dimension is added (as it must be in assessing the economics of early interventions), this confounds the problem.

It is advisable, therefore, that any further work clearly defines the areas of health economics and ageing populations to be addressed.

**7. Bibliography**


