Demography and Civil Society:
A Historical Perspective on Contemporary Transitions
and their Implications for Population Ageing

Working Paper Number 306

PHILIP KREAGER
Oxford Institute of Ageing, University of Oxford and Somerville College

October 2006
Oxford Institute of Ageing Working Papers
Editor: Philip Kreager
http://www.ageing.ox.ac.uk
Abstract:

The position of older people in a given society, like that of any minority or potentially disadvantaged group, depends on an effective balance of relationships between institutions of the state and of civil society. This is because what the state can or should do to assist older people often depends on the information and public debate that independent institutions are able to stimulate. The state, nonetheless, is commonly perceived as playing the predominant role in providing relevant population statistics and related critical information. History, however, shows that this is not necessarily the case. The need to develop analysis and data sources independent of the state is a continuing leitmotif of the history of population inquiry, especially as issues arise in transition from authoritarian government to a more open society.

Following a brief outline of this history, the potential importance of population data is explored with reference to ageing in two contemporary transitional societies. Recent developments in Indonesia suggest important comparisons to countries in Central and Eastern Europe, notably Poland. Transition toward democracy in both countries was abrupt and unexpected. It set in motion potentially far-reaching changes in the powers of local government, whilst creating an uncertain climate for welfare provision. Non-governmental institutions, which played key roles in ending authoritarian rule, have attained potentially greater capacity to influence family and ageing policy, but their co-ordination and information base remain poor. The availability and quality of population information on potentially disadvantaged groups, like older people, provides an index of the development of the public sphere.
Introduction

Recent interest in the development of civil society owes much to Jürgen Habermas’ widely read essay of the 1960s. Amongst Habermas’ themes was the charming idea that we owe much in the emergence of key practices of civil society in Europe – open discussion and printed debate engaging people of diverse ranks and sectors of society – to London’s coffee houses of the mid-17th Century. Lately historians have taken to pointing out that those coffee houses actually served some other distinctly uncivil functions too, notably as good listening posts for government spies, and as a venue for wenching. But there are many senses in which Habermas was undoubtedly correct. One of the most important of these, however, has never been remarked. I refer to the origins of demography and the purposes of population statistics.

A history of the relationship between population data, their uses, and the progress of civil society has never been written. That is unfortunate, as understanding this relationship forms a necessary background to the subject I wish to address here: the implications of ageing in contemporary societies undergoing political transition from authoritarianism. What people think about widely canvassed population problems, like ageing, tends to be shaped by what may be called a ‘statist’ conception of the role of population and statistics in modern society. The term ‘statistics’ is, after all, cognate with ‘the state’. The scope of centralised data systems -- censuses, registrations, public inquiries of all kinds -- together with endless recourse to national facts and figures in the media and politics -- all push us forcibly toward seeing collective problems and their possible solutions in terms of the state and the information it provides. Certainly, demographers most commonly interpret their data at that level of analysis. Unfortunately, one important matter for which this perspective is at best partial is the role of population research and its uses.

Demography, of course, does not merely describe quantitative dimensions of states; these dimensions are bound up very closely with the design and implementation of policies at many levels and, more particularly, in their assessment. The collectivity
of demographers and statisticians is inevitably divided, some functioning chiefly from the insides of governmental planning, but many more from the outside in non-governmental and academic institutions. Movement between internal and external roles is common, especially as new or revised procedures for data classification and collation are put in place. An important consequence of this wider social and institutional base of population thinking is that the formulation and use of data systems is not adequately characterised by the popular image of bureaucratic and statistical routine. Decisions about best practice and interpretation bring in (whether implicitly or explicitly) a range of technical, political, economic, social, medical, and other perspectives. Population researchers are a diverse lot, so in an open society debate naturally ensues. This is reflected in the range of institutional supports. Multiple philanthropic, corporate, religious, and scientific bodies now, as in the past, provide the main loci of independent inquiry and policy formation. As is well known, these bodies have often been partly supported by the state, a reminder that the boundary between state and civil society is by nature porous. The ‘takes’ of these bodies on state policies and alternatives inevitably vary.

In consequence, the history of population thinking is closely bound up with traditions of European political, economic and social thought that have been strongly critical as well as supportive of the role of the state, including criticism and support of authoritarian tendencies of government. On one hand, the movements of health and social reform with which population inquiry has been associated over more than two centuries have always been strongly motivated by wider issues of civic reform. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that authoritarian regimes of all kinds have found that the capacity to monitor and regulate subject populations can be significantly enhanced by systematic development of population data to these ends.

In short, a fundamental tension has long existed between the republican and autocratic potential of population thinking. Demographic practice arose as a component of civil society, being partly dependent on, and partly independent of, the agencies of states. We need to return to Habermas’ coffee houses and their consequences up into the 19th century, to see just how fundamental some of these issues are. This paper therefore begins with a brief historical survey. Counting people who are citizens inevitably raises issues of entitlement, franchise, and governmental
accountability. It is no accident that by the 19th century, ‘vital registration’ came also to be called ‘civil registration’.

The links between demographic knowledge and civil society are especially important in contemporary societies undergoing political and economic transformation. Non-governmental organisations, as is well known, have played a crucial role in effecting the transition from dictatorships in several parts of the world. Demographic institutions have not, as far as I am aware, played major roles in any of these developments; such institutions in authoritarian states are inevitably under-developed as a bulwark of civil society, as their range of inquiry and scientific independence are compromised. However, as public attention now turns to issues of reconstruction, the role of population data and research is significantly altered from its previous status in authoritarian regimes. Its role in identifying problems and vulnerable groups in society, in articulating their needs, and in the design, implementation and assessment of programmes, all require sustained attention. The development, quality, and proper use of population data thus become a critical test not only of new state policy and implementation. They are indicative of the emerging capabilities of civil society.

Our knowledge of the position of older people in transitional societies is a particularly telling index of these capabilities. Authoritarian regimes do not allow the great mass of working people to exercise their voice in policy. Older generations in transitional societies in consequence have not been accustomed to making their needs publicly known. Their age, moreover, means that they are no longer likely to be in positions of authority that would help them to do so. Meanwhile the economic disruptions that have accompanied political transition have seriously reduced – and in many cases eliminated – their financial support and social standing. Older working populations in transitional societies are thus vulnerable on several counts, and the extent to which their numbers and the character of their vulnerability are documented provides a minimum standard of how successfully basic institutions of civil society are evolving.

The second part of this paper considers two contemporary transitional societies in which the potential role of population knowledge in assessing the position of older people is explored. The conjunction of these cases – Indonesia and Poland – may at
first glance appear surprising. I am unaware of articles on any subject in which the situation of these two countries is juxtaposed. There are, however, important commonalities and contrasts in the development of civil society in these two states which make their comparison a matter of interest in itself. As we shall see, the institutional reconfiguration of the state and civil society in Poland and Indonesia that began in the 1980s and 1990s has potentially major implications for the situation of older people and their families today. The experiments in democracy being conducted in these countries have shifted much of the responsibility for the care of older people onto local government and non-governmental bodies. Whilst both countries have major traditions of independent organisation engaged in education and welfare, it is far from clear that these organisations have access to sufficient information on issues of health and economic disadvantage, or the capacity to generate such information for themselves, that would enable them to co-ordinate and put in place informed policies and programmes for older people.

1. Demography and Civil Society: A Short History

Modern population research is possibly unique amongst the human sciences in being able to trace its origins unquestionably to a single text without precursors, Graunt’s *Natural and Political Observations* (1662). A host of mathematical lights of the scientific revolution – Huygens, Halley, Leibniz, the Bernoullis – quickly took up his work, and Graunt was ushered directly into the Royal Society. We know from the records of the Society, however, that Graunt contributed little to its proceedings. A local merchant of marked republican leanings, reputed for his incisive wit and public engagement, Graunt wrote his book for a wider audience, and it sold well in the burgeoning pamphlet literature of the time: four reprints in three years. Copies were soon circulated to Holland, France, America and Germany. He developed his method and ideas in a context of hotly discussed contemporary issues -- how to cope with epidemic plague, restoration of the monarchy, and the conduct of government trade policy and its taxing of merchants. His work was both formed by, and helped to shape, these discussions, and we know it was actively engaged in the coffee houses. That indefatigable diarist and social gadfly, Samuel Pepys, had bought his copy of the
first edition a month after its publication. On more than one occasion, trotting along for his shot of caffeine, he found himself in conversation with Graunt who, for example,

did fully make it out that the trade of England is as great as it ever was, only in more hands; and that of all trades there is a greater number than ever there was, by reason of men’s taking more prentices, because of their having more money than heretofore. His discourse was well worth hearing.6

Graunt was not here just promoting mercantilism. Like people of all political and religious persuasions of the time, Graunt employed the convention of the ‘body politic’. In its usual formulation, a state can grow to greatness only if it is well proportioned or balanced. The political body, like the human body, is governed by its head or heart (the King) via its eyes and ears (his ministers). If they are wise and just, the arms and legs of the body politic (the common people or “members”) will become numerous and well distributed to carry out the needs of the economy, defence, and morality. The image of growing population and trade that Graunt recounts to Pepys is thus the best possible argument for the legitimacy of the English monarchy, newly restored in 1660.

The method of Graunt’s Observations, however, gave this old convention an entirely new dimension. Previously the idea of proportion or balance in the body politic was chiefly an analogy. What Graunt proposed was a method which would enable all men to calculate for themselves whether the policies and conduct of the state in fact produced balanced distributions. As we might now say, Graunt’s arithmetic made it possible to ‘target’ particular groups and issues in society for purposes of practical and moral evaluation. He showed, for instance, the extent to which wars and the growth of external trade had led to an insufficiency of “fighting men” (i.e. of an age to defend the country); whether fertility was abnormally low in some populations (indicating a state of lax morality, or “the true ratio formalis of adulteries and fornications”); which diseases were most fatal, and which parishes most unhealthy (i.e. indicating where best to reside in an era of recurring epidemics); whether epidemics had indeed increased (an indication of God’s disfavour, in an era in which monarchy was frequently justified as divine right); and so forth. At a stroke, Graunt’s method put empirical assessment of individual circumstances and the affects of government policy in the public domain.
Graunt was wary of the element of sedition implicit in all of this: although he was careful always to illustrate his method using positive examples, it was by no means automatic that balances would be favourable. His concluding sentence notes that quantitative evidence should perhaps be available only to the King and his councillors. Following Graunt, the desirability of a census became topical, and not only in England. Censuses were favoured not just by radicals and reformers like Spinoza, Franklin, or Necker, but by royalists like Petty and Vauban. In the 1670s Charles II would make a serious (if unsuccessful) effort to shut down the coffee houses where such matters could be discussed openly. For the next century and a half, although monarchs explored the advantages of systematic enumerations (notably, in France, Prussia and Sweden), they took care to ensure that the results were treated as state secrets.

Independent inquires nonetheless continued, as Graunt’s successors exploited local sources (tables of annuitants, parish records, local censuses), developed new ones (in hospitals and assurance societies), and occasionally gained privileged access to selected state tax records and population counts. Most population inquiries from the 17th to the end of the 18th century were frankly descriptive investigations of health and other inequalities; frequently referred to as ‘political arithmetic’, findings were presented as potentially constructive improvements within the remit of prevailing power structures. This conforms to prevailing views of civil society in the 17th and 18th centuries, which saw independent political and other associations not as opposed to the state, but as in effect part of it. (Threats to the state in this period, it may be remembered, were most strongly connected to competing Protestant and Catholic claims to kingship.)

To take, for illustration purposes, some central examples of independent analytical applications to pressing contemporary issues of state: by 1667, DeWitt and Hudde had used data on annuitants to revise Graunt’s method, with an eye to securing finances of the fledgling Dutch republic; Halley then showed that the English treasury, in its attempt to raise capital, had in fact under-priced its annuities; and Price showed how working men’s associations and assurance companies could use mortality data to design realistic life insurance policies in lieu of state provision. Price’s work is a reminder that, as the 18th century proceeded, concern for disadvantaged groups grew steadily, especially with regard to the conditions and rights of the poor. The potential
for conflict between the state and constituent groups gradually shifted away from issues of religious conformity to what we would now call the implications of inequitable economic development. The theme of population, from Montesquieu to Turgot, Necker and Condorcet, no longer employed the imagery of the body politic, but still emphatically attributed population imbalances to bad state policy. The favourite example was population decline owing to economic insecurity amongst working people -- unfair taxation and conscription of the poor made them reluctant to have more children. English and Scottish political arithmetic, from Price and Young to Eden, likewise connected depopulation with the problems of the poor. Malthus, of course, wrote the first edition of his *Essay on Population* (1798) as a repost to these critics, subsequently using his theory to propose an alternative approach to the English Poor Laws.

The study of population thus arose as an integral component of debates over the legitimacy of government policies during the *ancien régime*, and the plight of ordinary, poor, and disadvantaged people. Any discussion of the proper relationship between the people and the state led, sooner or later, to the crucible of contending republican and monarchical approaches to government. This work was carried on largely outside institutions of state, but with consistent reference to how government might be improved. DeWitt, Turgot, Necker, and Franklin remain particularly famous examples of men whose analyses were carried out both within and without the confines of governments of the time, but they were a few political arithmeticians amongst many. These and other analysts worked perforce with data from other sources, including charities, decentralised poor law administration, the clergy, hospitals, assurance societies, and the medical profession. With the revolutions in France and America, the linkage of this discourse on vital events and civic reform came more fully into the open. The idea that a modern nation-state is defined in terms of its whole population was a powerful solvent, and the rise of statistics (based directly on the methods of early modern population arithmetic) provided the necessary quantitative programme. Registration of a birth became a record of citizenship. If all citizens count, and the state is built on all citizens, then the state’s responsibility is to count them all. The nature of the state, its problems, and governance all became *officially* quantitative in form.
The founding of central statistical bureaux, charged with conducting censuses and a wide range of other public numerical inquiries, spread rapidly across Europe from the first decade of the 19th century. These bureaux were active both in responding to the needs of other new governmental bureaucracies and in using the data they collected to document social ills in need of reform. Individual and collective rights associated with citizenship evolved much more gradually over the next two centuries, as political, social and medical reformers contested the continuing privileges of elites. Statistics, however, quickly became the preferred evidence for argument on all sides. Mortality data became a powerful weapon in the hands of public health reformers. National economic management required occupational data, which liberals and socialists both employed powerfully in the debates over class formations. International statistical congresses took up the question of recording data on ethnic, religious and linguistic sub-populations; although most European governments remained wary of the dangers of official recognition of potential nationalist groups, these categories became fundamental in data systems of multi-national empires (Austria-Hungary, Russia, British India), and became central to subsequent communal politics in these empires. Non-governmental bodies proliferated, employing statistics to promote particular causes. These included not only independent statistical societies and professional associations of actuaries, physicians, and scientists, but avowed special interest reform bodies addressed to problems of sanitation, migration, prostitution, natural selection, female suffrage, the declining birth rate, and so forth. By the close of the 19th century, the late ancien régime debate over why poverty persists and what governments should do about it was the object of new statistical approaches ranging from Booth’s pioneering social surveys to the pseudo-genetic research of the Galton Laboratory.

In the 20th century, the role of population data as a ground of debate over entitlements of all kinds, and as a media in which governmental, international and non-governmental bodies formulate, carry out, and evaluate policies, are too ubiquitous to need summary here. Few would disagree that coverage, content, access and control of population data remain amongst the most fundamental questions facing modern civil society. The topical population issues which assail us daily in the press – ageing, low-fertility, immigration – are topical precisely because they pose problems on which current governmental policies appear at best problematic, and in which many institutions of civil society are engaged in active debate. Demographers and
statisticians will be found on more than one side of any one of these issues. On the one hand, we may consider this as positive evidence of the constructive attitude which population thinking continues to take in the public sphere. But on the other, it is also a reminder that scientific and purely technical methodologies do not provide a neutral or ‘default’ position that can be used to resolve such issues without need for discussion.

In sum, whilst we may feel some justifiable satisfaction in the development of demography and statistics as institutions of government and civil society, their application to current problems, like ageing, still faces major challenges. One fundamental challenge is to develop methods that adequately specify sub-populations in need, and the life course processes that have made them vulnerable. This requires distinguishing such populations, across a range of variables, from the many older people and families who are not vulnerable. The design of secure and equitable pension systems, the control of health expenditure, and the incorporation of older people as full members of society, all depend on this. We should keep in mind, therefore, that current transitional societies cannot simply look to Western precedent for demographic methodologies that provide all the data necessary to answer these problems.

We can draw four observations, at least, from this short history:

I. The position of any potentially disadvantaged group, like the elderly, is contingent on an effective balance between the institutions of state and of civil society.

II. Population data and analysis have a critical role to play in informing, assisting, and assessing what these institutions do.

III. This instrumental role of population data arose in Europe in the historical transition from authoritarian government, beginning in the mid-17th century, and became central to health, social and economic reforms in the modern state in the course of the 19th century. We may therefore expect that wherever the authoritarian impulse of government has loosened, the potential roles and importance of population inquiry are opened and require attention.

IV. The availability and quality of population data on a given disadvantaged group -- for example, evidence of the extent of public provision for older people – provides an index of the condition and state of development of the public sphere, i.e. of the effectiveness of relations between governmental and non-governmental organisations.
Let us now look at two current cases in point. In the following section I shall sketch the broad outlines of political transformation in Indonesia and Poland, highlighting a number of key institutional differences within what are remarkably similar paths of transition. We then turn to what these historical transformations have meant thus far for local institutions, with particular reference to the role of local government, religious organisations, and the situation of older people and their families. As we shall see, whilst some encouraging steps have been taken to incorporate older people as full members of society, the situation remains obscured by a lack of fundamental data. The paper concludes with a number of recommendations as to the kinds of information and methods that are required.

2. Transitional States and Civil Societies: Indonesia and Poland

Profound political change is widely acknowledged to have taken place in Poland in the period 1976-1991, and somewhat later in Indonesia, 1984-1999. In both countries the accumulative impact of sustained economic mismanagement by the state served as the precipitating factor. Disintegration of the economy, and associated levels of corruption, deprived existing authoritarian governments of a minimum of trust. They were no longer believed capable of carrying out basic economic and social functions. More fundamentally, the general population ceased to accept that systematic repression of basic human rights and economic opportunities, as had characterised these regimes, could be tolerated any longer. A backlash set in against recognised state corruption, inadequate health and welfare provision, and the cynical use of national and religious values to justify governmental policies. In this context, independent religious and secular organisations that had previously been divided and kept in check by the state began to work together. New alliances were formed. The military, which had long provided the regimes with ready means – or the threat -- of enforcing policy by violence, gradually distanced itself from preservation of the status quo. After a continuing period of uncertainty and economic decline, interim governments combining elements of the old regimes with members of independent bodies were formed, leading to free elections.
Since 1991 in Poland, and 1999 in Indonesia, the struggle has continued to attempt to rein in the powerful influence of old elites and political parties loyal to them. Successive elected governments have embarked on potentially wide-ranging reforms, notably decentralisation and privatisation as necessary checks against authoritarianism. The transition to open government and accountability is clearly an ongoing project, and serious doubts remain as to the degree of progress actually achieved. The situation has been made more difficult by the continuing effects of earlier economic mismanagement. Consequences include continuing low levels of public service provision; high levels of unemployment; and debt, poverty and inequality affecting major sub-populations, of which older people are a significant instance.

In neither state were older people a major policy concern of the old regimes, leaving the major support role to be taken by the family and local arrangements. These arrangements characteristically involved institutions and values having much older historical roots in Polish and Indonesian culture, particularly the influence of Catholicism and Islam, respectively. As political transformation proceeded, these traditional forces became a major factor in constraining and displacing the alliance of party machines and the military from the centre of power. Although the issue of population ageing is still struggling to find its full place on the policy agenda in Poland and Indonesia, the much greater prominence it has attained clearly owes to the changed position of independent civil institutions, and the rise of more open discussion between these institutions and governmental bodies of issues like ageing.

2.1 Institutional and Demographic Changes

It is not difficult to imagine the impact on moderate and low-income groups in Poland and Indonesia of abrupt increases in basic food costs on the order of 60 to 78 percent (see note 12). This impact was exacerbated by its timing, in two respects. First, a fragile but marked improvement of living standards in the immediately preceding decades left many families exposed to unemployment and existing debt when the economy turned down. Second, the crisis emerged in the same historical conjunct ure as a later stage of what population researchers call the demographic and health transition.
(Thus we have two different usages of ‘transition’ that coincide – political and demographic.) Population ageing, together with very low fertility, are the best-known features of the latter. Poland and Indonesia are typical of what may be called mid-to-late demographic transitions. One clear marker of this stage is that both countries possess large and sophisticated Central Statistical Bureaux, able to provide basic vital and economic statistics at national, regional and district levels. Bureaux in both countries have moved to increase survey coverage of basic economic issues raised by their economic crises.13

The ‘headline’ statistics of late demographic transition may be sketched very briefly, as the mass media have popularised the main facts -- “fewer babies, longer lives” -- of changing intergenerational relations. Poland (P) and Indonesia (I) are well along the continuum toward an ageing society. Life expectation has steadily improved to 74.5 (P) and 68 (I). Total fertility per woman in P stands at 1.25, and at 2.2 in I, where four provinces with more advanced age structures have fertility below replacement (the lowest, Jakarta, at 1.63). The proportion of persons over 60 in P is currently approaching 17 per cent, and some provinces are near 19 per cent. In I the corresponding figures are 8 and 15 percent, respectively. In rural areas, where many young persons have moved out to the cities, the proportion of older people will be even higher. Estimated proportions of persons over age 60 in P are expected to reach 23 per cent by 2020, and 11.3 per cent in I at that date. National figures, as just noted, disguise major regions and localities with much greater age structural imbalances. What is very different between the two countries is the absolute size of ageing cohorts. The United Nations estimate of over 17 million persons age 60 and above in Indonesia in 2002 is equivalent to nearly half the total population of Poland.

Family systems in the two countries share major characteristics. The largest concentration of Indonesians live on the island of Java, some 124 million persons, whose family systems are nuclear, as in Europe. Complex households involving more than one couple and their children are a small minority, usually less than ten per cent.14 Historical demography has shown that such patterns date at least to the 19th century, and earlier in Poland.15 Wider kinship is reckoned bilaterally, so that networks of kin able to provide support are theoretically extensive, encompassing both husband’s and wife’s kin. In the Indonesian case, comparative anthropological and demographic
research has shown, however, that in practice the number of kin on whom older people rely for support is small, usually in a range of five or six persons or less, and focused strongly on children.\textsuperscript{16} Network data for Indonesian communities show that poor older people often feel uncertain which children will be available to help them in times of need, a pattern obviously encouraged by high levels of labour migration. Movement tends, however, to be recurrent and often temporary, and only involves some children; levels of continuing contact and support in times of crisis are high. For example, although upwards of half of poor elders’ children in rural communities have been found to have migrated, the percentage left without support is very small.\textsuperscript{17} Family support patterns in both countries involve major contributions from the elder generation; in Indonesia, as has been documented more widely in Western Europe, net flows of support continue to be downward, even where older parents are relatively poor.\textsuperscript{18} Networks of very poor elders, moreover, appear to gain crucial assistance both in Poland and Indonesia from activities of local government and religious organisations, to which we will return, below.

The consequences of recent economic crisis and political transition in the two countries show some important general similarities. More particularly, there are commonalities in their attempts to decentralise governmental decision-making, and to move social and welfare service allocation to local levels. In Poland, the Sejm in 1990 passed local self-government and administration acts that gave communes autonomy, with elected councils responsible for health, education and other local services. Elected provincial assemblies were created, although provincial governors remained appointed by the central government. In Indonesia, the national assembly passed similar legislation in 1999, except that regional governors are also elected. The express purpose of these changes in both cases was to promote more direct involvement and local choice in government. In both cases decentralised control extended to budgetary powers which, however, legislation did not completely clarify, giving rise to controversy and opportunities for mismanagement at provincial and district levels.\textsuperscript{19} At the community level, however, the situation appears clearer, if only because most local initiatives have to be funded out of local sources, either by tax or charity. A certain amount of money is provided by regional or national governments, but additional money, or money for specific projects, may now be raised autonomously, and the
allocation of money to projects is a matter of decision by the new elected local councils.

One crucial area in which central government policy has remained pre-eminent is pensions. Here there are marked contrasts between the two countries, both in the state’s approach and in local attitudes to employment late in life. Indonesian state pensions address less than 5 per cent of the workforce. Coverage by mandatory formal sector schemes reaches a further 15 per cent, but this is limited by rules that allow employers to base provision on only a fraction of real pay, with the result that benefits amount to only an insignificant lump sum at retirement. Plans for comprehensive pension and health care, now under review, are not expected to be in place before 2025 at best, and their realism is seriously questioned. Not surprisingly, in view of such incomplete coverage, nearly half of older men and a quarter of older women remain in the labour market; amongst older men aged 60 to 65 the employment figure is 80%. Whilst an extensive framework of local health clinics (pukesmas) is maintained with state support, training in geriatric medicine is not provided, and hospital and pharmaceutical costs must be met by all but the poorest elders and their families.

Polish attitudes to late life employment reflect a different institutional history. In the 1990s, restructuring of public enterprises became a major source of unemployment, which was achieved in large part by early retirement. By 2000, half of women and 25 per cent of men aged 55 to 59 were unemployed; re-employment rates in these age groups were only 40 and 51 per cent, respectively. The tendency not to return to work is fully supported by peoples’ opinions as reported in attitude surveys, which show broad consensus for the view that, in times of labour shortage, employers and most older people themselves think that jobs should go to younger people. Pension levels at around US$ 160 per month put older people in a bind: as state health care has cut costs by moving from hospital based models to community care, pensioners’ incomes leave them above the level that would qualify for free social and health services, yet unable to afford basic drugs and related medical costs; significant variations in community level care further undermine access. Pension reforms in 1999 moved progressively to a three pillar system, but not for those people already over
50. Not surprisingly, the phrase ‘lost generation’ is often applied to older cohorts, which has undoubtedly helped to stimulate a recent policy review.26

2.2 Local Problem Solving and the Need for Information

Decentralisation of government programmes usually implies a double agenda. On the one hand, there is hopefully a real commitment to the spread of democracy to all policy levels. On the other, the agenda is one of cutting centralised state costs, and transferring responsibility for difficult tasks. Decentralised responsibility opens up a large space for civil society organisations, not only in providing services, but in stimulating debate and advocacy to make sure that financial and other support provided by the central government is adequate, and that the information base needed to formulate and carry out policies develops sufficiently. Decentralised responsibility also opens up a large space for potential mismanagement and corruption. Local governments, both in Poland and Indonesia, thus recently found themselves suddenly in the front line – but a front line that was not clearly demarcated. They have had little experience with many of the tasks they are now supposed to undertake. They still tend to include vested interests. Independent organisations addressed to critical issues, like population ageing, are either few or non-existent. Economic changes have continued to put severe constraints on many family networks. A very real question, therefore, is simply: How have people coped? This, of course, entails further questions: What structures and ad hoc arrangements have developed at the local level to meet the needs of older people? What public and private infrastructure was available, or emerged, to co-ordinate activities? What data do we have on this process, and what sources of information are available to support regional, district and local organisations?

At this stage a new dimension in the need for information at local and other population levels becomes unavoidable: it is no longer sufficient or possible for basic data to be assembled entirely by centralised authorities. However sound a central statistical bureau may be, the issues are only partly within its remit. There is a need to identify and understand the distribution, composition and relationships of older people in relation to local institutions, to study how local networks and decision-making actually function. These are tasks that require study by independent individuals and organisations. Institutional processes – networks, status hierarchies, and relationships -- are ordinarily not included in standard
 statistical inquiries. Intermediate links between several levels of government and other institutions of society, including their links to family systems, do not fit tidily into the standard rubric of macro- and micro-analysis into which descriptive statistics and their use in policy are usually squeezed. The data needs of civil society, in short, are not identical with current official statistical practice – and the information produced by both will continue to require scientific scrutiny if it is to be reliable.

The information that has emerged on the elderly and local decision-making processes can be described as, at best, fragmentary. For Poland, an extensive listing of institutions has been completed by Perek-Bialas and Ruzik, in order to identify relevant actors. They were able to include, for example, regional, municipal and other local government bodies, pensioners’ and other associations led by older people themselves, specialist ageing NGOs, academic and gerontological societies, and business groups, although their coverage is acknowledged as incomplete in some key areas (e.g. labour unions, the Church). They found that policy and practice have tended to be created spontaneously amongst bodies working in a given locality, but systematic co-operation between institutions hardly exists. Interviews conducted by Kubicki in three provinces confirm this finding, and he further notes that effective organisations only tend to arise where local elites, including a small number of healthy, retired older individuals with adequate resources, devote themselves to building effective local organisations. There remains, however, no effective regulation of what such organisations do, Filinson and Niklas concluding that most local establishments involved in care have actively avoided licensing. A great number of studies simply conclude that we know entirely too little about whether and how well local organisations involving or directed to the needs of older people actually function. In Nunckowska and Perek-Bialas’s view this “huge information gap” makes detailed analysis of the health care sector virtually impossible; Regulska’s assessment of the activities of local elites more generally in the reform of local government concludes similarly. One thing which is striking even about this critical literature is the very limited attention given to the activities of family and church networks, which in so much of Polish history have served as the basic institutional mechanisms of local elite organisation and daily survival in periods of crisis.

Some idea of the ways in which local government and independent civil organisations respond to inevitable constraints on family-based welfare and the elderly may be gained in the case of Indonesia. There comparative field studies embracing ethnography, life course
research, and randomised survey techniques have been combined to situate older people and their families in local communities. Differences between socio-economic strata, patterns of inter-generational transfers within and between them, and the size and structure of family networks in a context of high levels of migration, have all been documented. Interpreting the implications of these data at wider levels of aggregation is necessarily tentative, as research on longitudinal change, and correlation of village level findings with data from district and provincial surveys regularly conducted by the Central Statistical Bureau, are still in process. The three communities that are the loci of research, whilst chosen to reflect significant economic, ethnic and other variations, nonetheless reveal common patterns of adaptation to meet current demands and constraints faced by elderly members of society.

The economic crisis of 1997-8 in Indonesia was both shorter and produced less economic restructuring than the case of Poland. In particular, there was no large-scale permanent collapse of employment in state controlled industries, and the state had not in any case ever provided universal pension or unemployment benefits. ‘Unemployment’ as a survey classification is rarely useful: those people who describe themselves as ‘unemployed’ in Indonesian economic surveys tend to be a tiny minority amongst those rich enough not to have to work. Urban sectors hit hard by the economic crisis, like construction and services, included many migrant labourers who became much more likely to return to rural areas. Indonesian family economy in rural areas, which has for some time combined a mixture of economic venues, typically includes some combination of family members engaged in traditional agriculture, in local production and trade, and in temporary or permanent labour migration. The ability to rely on networks of support, and to move to where a livelihood is available, proved to be a major asset during the economic crisis, which some commentators now argue was therefore much less severe than was first reported.

At a local level, however, the impact was bound to vary considerably. For example, those families with remitting members located outside South East Asia (i.e. unaffected by the crisis), discovered that the collapse of the Rupiah translated into substantially increased incomes; some communities actually experienced a boom in construction work during and after the crisis. More generally, however, the return of out-of-work urban migrants, the corresponding decline in remittances, and diminished demand for services at local levels, undoubtedly put increased pressure on poorer families. For those belonging to lower socio-economic strata, we therefore need to consider what provision local government and
independent institutions customarily make for the poor, including elders, and how the consequences of political transition affected this.

Members of local government at the village level in Indonesia are not civil servants, but elected or appointed from their constituencies. Under the legislation passed in 1999, the central government no longer has jurisdiction to approve or disapprove of elected village heads, who are able to influence the use of funding from central government, as well as being able to generate local funds for specific purposes by soliciting contributions from local business and better-off members of the community. Local health committees (*kader*), usually made up of prominent women in the community, likewise act independently in conjunction with government health authorities. Entitlement to monthly distributions of subsidised rice (*sembako*), to health subsidy cards, to fuel subsidies, grants to small businesses, and some other benefits (in some cases introduced temporarily by the government as part of Social Security Net schemes following the crisis), are thus shaped directly by the advice and information which local government, and local civil society committees, give. A key piece of information, decided by local village heads and their committees, is which elders and families in a community are in need. This system, as Daly and Fane note, has worked more equitably in the distribution of health benefits than other areas, but unfortunately programmes were not assessed by the age of recipients; Utomo, in contrast, concludes that sub-district and village level administration was simply not prepared to handle new responsibilities, and that conditions have deteriorated.

The ability of community members to influence the distribution of benefits, and to undertake independent initiatives, obviously cuts two ways: top-down party political influence from the centre is restricted, but there remains the chance that the bulk of assistance will be directed to those members of the community connected by family ties to local government. In some communities local government opted to distribute subsidies equally amongst all households, rather than targeting the poor, on the argument that if the government provides something for the people, everyone should benefit. There may also be issues of competence: some communities lose out altogether in the distribution of subsidies, or receive in general much less from central government initiatives owing to a lack of local initiative in securing funds.
Activities of religious organisations normally complement and support local government in various ways. A simple but characteristic instance is provided by the West Javanese community included in the comparative study: there local government has found that the easiest and best way to organise meetings and make information available is via the Mosque’s loudspeaker system. More important, Islamic tradition charges the Mosque with responsibility to distribute zakat, usually an annual gift of money and rice, to needy members of the congregation, of which poor elderly are major recipients. Payment of zakat is a religious responsibility of all Muslims, and many poorer families contribute as well as receive; funds collected surplus to annual gifts are used in other Mosque activities in which elders, as frequently active members of the congregation, are likely to benefit. Zakat is in general directed primarily to members of the religious community regardless of family connection, but may also pass directly to known relatives of congregation members. In the West Sumatran research site, this has meant that Muslim new-comers to the village, who work as agricultural labourers for rich villagers, but tend to orient themselves towards mosques in the poorest hamlet, lose out in the distribution. By contrast, in the East Javanese site, poor Hindus benefit from Islamic generosity, albeit amid a subtle subtext of proselytization. That said, religious authorities in some cases turn to local government for assistance in identifying needy households, and local government may itself contribute to zakat from its own local funds. It is not unusual for the networks of local government members and Mosque elders to overlap. Members of the local elite also contribute independent charitable gifts to the poor (sedekah), as Islam enjoins.

In short, poor elders are potentially part of a complex web of local support, embracing activities of local government and religious bodies, not to mention the actions of family networks and the frequent informal provision of meals by neighbours. Just how much support is actually given, and how important it is to the livelihood of poor elders, is obviously a question of interest. In the three communities under comparative analysis, the percentage of households actually receiving zakat varies between 17.5 and 47 per cent, in which poor households with elderly members figure prominently (in the two Javanese communities, households with elderly are more likely to benefit, as they are overrepresented amongst poorer households; in the Sumatran community, however, young households are worse off than households with older members, and consequently they get more zakat). One community did not participate in government distribution of subsidised rice, whilst in the other two, 50 per cent, or nearly 100 per cent, of poor households received assistance;
sembako is commonly distributed preferentially to older people, regardless of their economic level. Taken together, these two sources of assistance add up to a little less than one-fifth of minimum annual needs of older recipients (calculated on the basis of local survey and price data), a significant contribution in the context of other possible Mosque assistance and the contributions of kin.36 These sources of assistance do not extend, however, to medical costs (aside from the health subsidy) or to personal care in illness, which remain the primary responsibility of families.

The financial strength of local religious organisations varies considerably, poorer communities managing little more than a modest annual distribution, whilst in other communities the Mosque may take an active role not only in collecting remittances from migrants for community development purposes, but also for large social funds (e.g. for health care costs, assistance in calamities). It is of note that, of the three communities involved in the comparative study, stronger Mosque organisation and support for elders was associated with the community having the most highly organised links, notably migration networks, extending outside the community37. It is an open question whether the strength of local religious organisations may depend in important respects on the extent of their affiliation with national Muslim organisations. As the role played in recent political events by leaders of the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama has demonstrated (see note 12), such networks provide a conduit for the recognition of policy issues, the discussion of reforms, and the agency to help effect them. Whether awareness of population ageing, and appropriate national policies to address its implications, will gain ground in public debate in Indonesia may well depend on such institutions.

Such awareness, however, evidently depends on having adequate sources and flows of information. Good cause of death records are an obvious case in point, since they have an important bearing on what geriatric care and training are needed, and where. Relative access to health care is another datum for which information is needed. In the three communities studied in the comparative project, access was strongly influenced by socio-economic status. Low socio-economic position translates not only into the inability of many members of poor groups to meet major health costs, but into their reluctance to expose themselves to pity on account of their lack of sufficient social connections. Such concerns similarly restrict participation in old people’s clubs, in the two communities that had them, to those who are moderately or well off. The welfare and educational activities of religious organisations and
local committees would appear to make them well-placed to observe and call attention to these problems. As in Poland, however, the extent to which activities of local organisations are co-ordinated, or linked to national institutions able to engage in public debate, remain at best very incompletely documented. It is difficult, moreover, to build a general picture of socio-economic disadvantage in the absence of an agreed national schema of socio-economic stratification. The latter problem reflects both the diversity of Indonesian society and the familiar limitations of constructing standard units of comparison based on household survey data in societies where networks linking households to each other, and to other institutions, are of major importance.  

3. Concluding Note

Knowledge of the composition and distribution of population has been recognised as instrumental to good government since the mid-17th century. It has, more particularly, been recognised as important information upon which public discussion of specific policies and practices, and their potential reform, necessarily depend. This role emerged in the context of political transition and reform as European states moved away from authoritarian models. The provision and analysis of population data remain important criteria of government accountability in the world today. Although compilation and publication of basic population data are commonly considered to be predominantly a state function, history shows that this perception is incorrect. From the earliest population arithmetic and analysis onwards, the development of population information has depended on active engagement of individuals and organisations outside government. Even with the rise of modern nation-states in the 19th century, and the vast bodies of population data that their bureaucracies have and continue to produce, major roles continue to be played by the independent analyses and compilations of individuals and institutions of civil society. The resulting discourse, in helping to identify problems of society, in designing more or less apt policies, in assessing outcomes, and in generating debate, shows that an effective role for population data in government depends on a balance of state and independent activities.

The argument of this paper thus leads to two general theses. The first is that the availability and quality of population data, together with their open discussion and analysis, are an index of development in the public sphere, \textit{i.e.} of the effectiveness of relations between
government and civil society. The second is that the role of population data and their discussion are likely to become critical in the transition from authoritarian to more open forms of society and government, i.e. when the role and capacities of civil society institutions are not yet secure. In an era in which the potential growth of democratic process around the world has become topical, the independence and quality of population data and analysis should, by definition, become a paramount issue. It is these data, after all, that take a fundamental role in identifying the life and death, health and other elementary circumstances, of citizens. Current sources of instability in transitional societies notwithstanding, a solid basis of population knowledge for informed discussion in and outside of government is arguably fundamental if political transitions are to succeed.

The complexity of modern population issues, like ageing, and of the information and methods of analysis needed to understand them, make serious demands on institutions of civil society and their members. Immense variations of capacity and performance in this role are evident from country to country. Current transitional societies, like Indonesia and Poland, represent only the most recent phase in the long story of the issues raised by vital data for the emergence of more open society. Technical and other assistance necessary to improve the capacity of civil society organisations to generate and analyse population data deserves an important place on demography’s agenda. In other words, familiar deficiencies that exist in the data of many transitional and more particularly developing countries, notably in vital registration, cause of death compilation, partial censuses and the like, are important not only because they undermine demographic analysis, but because the missing or dubious data are fundamental to assessing not only socio-economic conditions, but human rights. The existence of these data and related methodological deficiencies needs to be prominently noted and discussed in professional media, not confined to technical footnotes. Whilst survey programmes in some countries have marked an important effort to compensate for these lacunae, a status quo in which some countries have adequate vital registration and related statistics, and others make do with health surveys of varying quality, clearly amounts to a double standard.

One thing that is striking about current transitional societies is that the information needed to secure good treatment of potentially disadvantaged groups, like sectors of the older population, now extends beyond what institutions of state can provide. Dependency ratios, life expectation, total fertility and other measures are easily recited from standard sources.
Issues of civil society, however, often belong to a range of social phenomena that do not fit discretely into standard categories of micro- and macro-level analysis typically employed in policy debates. As the Indonesian and Polish examples attest, an important example of the kinds of information needed is better documentation of network processes that link different types and levels of institutional engagement, embracing older people and the many organisations that affect their lives. This lacuna is also evident in our understanding of population ageing in advanced economies.

Endnotes

This paper was originally prepared for the international meeting “Impact of Ageing: A Common Challenge for Europe and Asia”, University of Vienna, 6-9 June, 2006. The author wishes to thank Gudrun Biffl for encouraging this contribution to her session at the meeting, Elisabeth Schröder-Butterfill for comments, and the Wellcome Trust for supporting the research on Indonesia reported in the paper.

5 Definitions of ‘civil society’ vary, as governmental and non-governmental institutions, and their relationships, have developed differently in diverse cultures and periods. Since Habermas’s seminal essay, historians of early modern Europe have shown that the picture of civil society existing outside and, indeed, in opposition to the state, radically simplifies, and often misrepresents, the evolution of a long and complex set of relationships. See, for example, Civil Society in British History, J. Harris, ed., Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003.
10 The literature on the role of independent initiatives on population issues in 19th-century social, economic and sanitary reform is immense. A useful discussion of its contemporary relevance is S. Szreter, ‘Economic

11 A case in point (the sub-population of childless elders) is given in P. Kreager, ‘Where are the Children?’, in Ageing Without Children, European and Asian Perspectives, Berghahn: Oxford, 2004), pp. 1-45.

12 Beneath the broadly parallel paths of political transition in Poland and Indonesia outlined above, there are of course many important differences. Most readers are unlikely to be familiar with both transitions, so I shall provide here a very brief summary of how the main institutional players of the era leading up to transformation – the party machine, the military, and independent religious and secular organisations -- were reconfigured in the last decades of the 20th century. I rely on excellent syntheses of recent events in the two countries, to which the reader may refer (T. G. Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, Penguin Books: London, 1999; M. H. Bernhard, The Origins of Democratisation in Poland, Columbia University Press: New York, 1993; and R. W. Hefner, Civil Islam, Muslims and Democratisation in Indonesia, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2000; and J. Bresnan, ed., Indonesia The Great Transition, Rowan and Littlefield: Oxford, 2005), as well as other sources cited below. Three aspects of this process may be highlighted:

1. The party, the military, and the threat of force.
In the decades prior to the 1980s, powerful single party political machines were built in Poland and Indonesia in close alliance with the army. Polish communism was, of course, installed during Soviet military occupation in the aftermath of World War II, its leaders brought from exile in Moscow, whilst Polish organisations of wartime resistance were executed and dispersed. The Soviets redrew the boundaries of Poland, and forced the migration of millions of people that this entailed. Polish party and military leaders continued to be summoned to Moscow for policy ‘guidance’ into the late 1980s, and the threat of Soviet military occupation was widely feared during the transition. A direct outcome of Soviet influence was the intervention of the military, in the midst of the Polish crisis in 1981, General Jaruzelski thence becoming head of state until 1990.

In Indonesia, General (and, subsequently, President) Soeharto came to power by overthrowing the pro-communist government of Sukarno, in 1965. A bloody purge of the communist party ensued (R. Cribb, ed., The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali. Clayton: Monash University, 1990). In its place, the ‘New Order’ governing party, Golkar, was formed of several constituent groups: the military, particularly advisors in Soeharto’s circle, remained the dominant force; civil servants were required to become party members; all opposition parties were merged into two, which left them chronically subject to internal disagreements; and from 1973, unions were brought increasingly under government control, a unitary trade union being fully established in 1985. The function of the military, as guarantor of national order, was underlined by its unrestrained operations in East Timor and Aceh, which both undermined its standing in Indonesia, and made it a recognised subject of international opprobrium.

One consequence of Poland’s long history of subjection to foreign powers, notably its partition during the 19th century by the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Prussian Empires, was a close identification of its religious and national identities: Catholic faith and the Church were long-established bulwarks of Polish nationhood. Russian return to dominion in the post-war era reactivated and strengthened the Church’s position with ordinary people, by returning it to its central role in national resistance. The communist government failed in its attempt to subjugate Cardinal Wyszynski, and by the late 1960s the Catholic Church had responded to communist rule by formulating a new social philosophy based on what it considered God-given human rights, notably free participation in public life. One of the architects of this philosophy, Karol Wojtyla, became Pope John Paul II in 1978. As neither the Church nor the people wished to encourage further Soviet military intervention, the Catholic hierarchy adopted a consistently moderate line, counselling against direct confrontation with the state, and developing its own media of communication as well as a range of local social and welfare services to compensate for state deficiencies. The Church characteristically took the line of supporting the state where issues did not compromise its independence.

Religion and national identity are likewise closely entwined in Indonesian history. Its two mass Islamic organisations, one reformist (the Muhammadiyah, established in 1912) and one traditional (Nahdlatul Ulama, dating to 1926), both emerged in the rise of nationalist opposition to Dutch colonial rule. (Alfrian, Muhammadiyah, Gadjah Mada University Press: Yogyakarta, 1989; D. E. Ramage, ‘Social
Organizations: Nhdlatul Ulama and Pembangunan’, in R. W. Baker, et al., Indonesia The Challenge of Change, KITLV Press/ISEAS: Singapore,1999, pp.201-216). The primary focus of both on the education and welfare of the faithful provided major alternative structures to the colonial state; although officially apolitical, both groups became increasingly associated with political parties as they emerged post-independence. The Soeharto regime, having initially adopted a pluralist doctrine (Pancasila) which recognised five major faiths, moved increasingly to a position of ultraconservative Islam, attempting to play the main Islamic religious organisations and ethnic groups off against each other. For a time this succeeded, exacerbated by rivalries within the religious community, but by the late 1990s both organisations mentioned above had moved to positions in which co-operation with the regime was recognised as inconsistent with their own interests and civil society functions. In the crisis period of 1998, both major groups explicitly opposed the government. In the first post- Soeharto election, the leader of Nahdlatul Ulama became President and the former head of Muhammadiyah became Speaker of the national assembly.

3. Economic Crisis and the Emergence of New Alliances
During the 1970s the Polish government embarked simultaneously on a major programme of economic modernisation. New investments in heavy industry, wage rises, and the import of Western consumer goods, were all financed by foreign borrowing. The effect was to create a superficial improvement in living standards that was quickly undermined by mismanagement: cost overruns and party corruption; investment in industries for which there was no export market; increasing dependence on foreign foodstuffs; and mounting hard currency debt repayments. The classic revolutionary climate of frustrated rising popular expectations coincided with an unwillingness of Western governments to continue major loans to an uncreditworthy government. In 1976 the government attempted to introduce price rises on basic food items of, on average, 60 per cent. Faced with widespread strikes, the government quickly backed down, whilst brutally repressing and imprisoning the strikers. The repression led to the first major new alliance, between workers and disaffected members of the intelligentsia, leading to the formation of a Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR), to the famous ‘flying university, to a burgeoning unregulated print counter-culture, and to the consolidation of the labour movement ‘Solidarity’ as an effective national institution. Whilst the Church publicly cautioned strike leaders, its ideology of basic human rights, together with traditional icons of faith, provided a common language and symbolism of protest, and individual priests and Catholic intellectuals became actively involved – including three Papal visits, in 1979, 983, and 1987, which served as mass rallies of protest. Although the rising cycle of strikes was stopped by imposition of military rule under Jaruzelski in 1981, there was nothing the army could do to rectify the economic situation. Consultations between protestors and the government had become inescapable by 1987, Solidarity and other unions were legalised, and the presidential election held in 1990 resulted in the victory of the head of Solidarity, Lech Walesa. The national assembly in the same year passed legislation to decentralise state authority, providing for local government based on elected councils which, in turn, elected members of provincial assemblies. Parliamentary elections followed in 1991.

The Indonesia economic crisis that began in 1997 also combined the elements of rising expectations, party corruption, industrial and financial mismanagement, strikes and widespread popular alienation. The centralising powers which the Golkar Party had consolidated from 1965 onwards succeeded in mobilising economic growth for two decades, at the price of a growing consolidation of wealth in the party elite, and in the Soeharto family in particular. Unfortunately, much of the investment in new industrial technology, and lack of credible economic management in international financial markets, proved a disaster as in the Polish case (A. Ananta, ed., The Indonesian Crisis: A Human Development Perspective, ISEAS: Singapore, 2003; G. Forrester, ed., Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?, KITLV Press/ISEAS: Singapore, 1999). The attempt to place labour under a single union, rather than controlling unrest, encouraged unofficial strike action, since that became the only venue for expressing grievances; major strikes steadily increased from 40 in 1987 to nearly 300 in 1994 (S. Rinakit, ‘ Trade Unions and Labour Unrest’, in R. W. Baker, et al., Indonesia The Challenge of Change, KITLV Press/ISEAS: Singapore, 1999, pp.139-158). Soeharto’s policy of playing Muslim groups off against each other, in addition to discrediting the government, also encouraged divisions within the military at a time when it was increasingly sensitive about its reputation. When the economic crisis struck the several South East Asian ‘tiger economies’ in 1997-8, all of these problems began to unravel. The crisis removed the willingness of the international financial community to continue to underwrite government borrowing, and net foreign investment collapsed. General inflation soared in Indonesia by 78 per cent, with food prices escalating by 118 per cent (A. Suryahadi, et. al., ‘The Evolution of Poverty during the


24 J. Perek-Bialas and A. Ruzik, 2004 (see note 13).


26 E. Frańczak 2006 (see note 13).

27 J. Perek-Bialas and A. Ruzik 2004, p. 9 (see note 13).


29 Filinson and Niklas, (see note 25)

31 Ageing in Indonesia is a longitudinal anthropological and demographic study of ageing in three communities, in West and East Java, and West Sumatra, funded by the Wellcome Trust. For details see above references to articles by P. Kreager and by E. Schröder-Butterfill.


38 An excellent discussion of several of the difficulties that arise is provided by A. Ananta and Bakhtiar, ‘Who are ‘lower class’ in Riau Archipelago, Indonesia?’ Revised draft pf a paper presented at the Sixth Annual Population Research Conference on “Linkage between Population and Millennium Development Goals: The Asian Perspective”, Islamabad, Pakistan, 29 November – 1 December, 2005; see also Kreager and Schröder-Butterfill, 2006 (see note 16).

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