Protests against raising the pension age have been shaking Russia this summer, with more expected in September, despite President Putin’s firm announcement that the increase is inevitable. There is, as we know, nothing particularly unusual either in the fact that governments in countries with increasing life expectancy should want to raise the age of entitlement to public pensions or in the unpopularity of such proposals. Public protests, moreover, make good sense when there are precedents for the efficacy of popular activism in getting governments to change their mind on such matters, or at least to postpone implementation.
The fact that these protests can be seen as predictable doesn’t mean, though, that they aren’t worth a second look. The countries of post-Soviet Eastern Europe, as well as sharing a common institutional history with Russia are all grappling with similar issues over the responsiveness of their pension age to the dynamics of population ageing. What also seem to be shared are tropes and ideas that are continually repeated in the way that the debate is being played out in different media, and have helped embed various misconceptions in the minds of ordinary people.
First of all, and most prominent, there is a claim that runs something like this: with low life expectancy, (and it is relatively low, especially for men in Russia), people won’t receive pensions at all or they will die very soon after becoming eligible. In other words, they won’t be able to enjoy their pensions for very long. The mass media keep repeating this view, and in doing so point to figures for life expectancy at birth to substantiate their claim. These data are, however, much less relevant (and potentially misleading) to a debate about pension age than life expectancy at age 60 (which is the current pension age for Russian men). Although male life expectancy at birth in Russia in 2017 was indeed only 65 years, male life expectancy at the age of 60 was 15 years. It’s simply a mistake to use a figure for life expectancy at birth as an indicator of how long the average 60 year old man can expect to receive a pension. Men who survive to the age of 60 (and many don’t - 32.5% according to the latest WHO data - which is why life expectancy at birth is as low as it is) have a good chance of receiving a pension for much longer than the 5 years that popular media would have them believe.
It is also important, I think, to understand a symbolic component of the pension debate that is quite specific to the region. Otherwise it will be hard for the outsider to get a sense of why the pension question is so emotionally charged. It is seen as a generational issue, and has a lot to do with the period at which prospective pensioners starting accruing their pensions. Were they accrued in the Soviet state, or afterwards, in the post-Soviet state? The people who are coming up to retirement now and for whom the age of entitlement is set to change in the near future, spent (almost) half of their working lives under the institutions of the Soviet state, and subsequently they lived and worked during the turbulence caused by “economic transition” - which means that they survived several economic crises. Many people had their savings wiped out during these years, and hence their only source of retirement income is the basic PAYG component.
When this generation started their working lives, they understood that their pension would be a reward for years of work for the Soviet state (there was no private economy). This view of the matter has somehow persisted through all the changes that happened to “the State” afterwards, perhaps because the PAYG system kept its place as the main pillar of public pension financing. This why, when people approaching pension age today think about pensions, they still operate with analytical categories that no longer apply to present conditions. They think of a pension as a deserved reward for loyal service to the State, but this does not correspond to the reality of public pensions in the post-Soviet state with a privatised economy.
Last of all, it has to be born in mind that pensions in the region are low by comparison with most high-income countries. It is very difficult to satisfy even basic needs on a pension which amounts to 35-40% of the average salary (with exceptions of pensions for special state service for a small number of people), and do not satisfy basic needs, especially when out-of-pocket payments for medication and medical services are significant.
In my view a proper understanding of what pensions mean to different age cohorts could help to reshape the often bitter and polarised debates about pension age between the exponents of an official position and the defenders of popular rights. It could help move government away from its entrenched and one-sided view of the matter if they were see the point of pursuing different communication strategies with different age groups, and from here it’s a short step to realising the desirability of more nuanced policies for phasing-in measures of pension reform.
About the Author
Katia Padvalkava is a sociologist researching ageing and working in later life in Central and Eastern European countries.
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